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Virtual reality (VR) has made its way into mainstream psychological research in the last two
decades. This technology, with its unique ability to simulate complex, real situations and
contexts, offers researchers unprecedented opportunities to investigate human behavior in
well controlled designs in the laboratory. One important application ofVR is the investigation
of pathological processes in mental disorders, especially anxiety disorders. Research on
the processes underlying threat perception, fear, and exposure therapy has shed light
on more general aspects of the relation between perception and emotion. Being by its
nature virtual, i.e., simulation of reality, VR strongly relies on the adequate selection of
speciﬁc perceptual cues to activate emotions. Emotional experiences in turn are related to
presence, another important concept in VR, which describes the user’s sense of being
in a VR environment. This paper summarizes current research into perception of fear
cues, emotion, and presence, aiming at the identiﬁcation of the most relevant aspects
of emotional experience in VR and their mutual relations. A special focus lies on a series of
recent experiments designed to test the relative contribution of perception and conceptual
information on fear in VR. This strand of research capitalizes on the dissociation between
perception (bottom–up input) and conceptual information (top-down input) that is possible
inVR. Further, we review the factors that have so far been recognized to inﬂuence presence,
with emotions (e.g., fear) being the most relevant in the context of clinical psychology.
Recent research has highlighted the mutual inﬂuence of presence and fear in VR, but
has also traced the limits of our current understanding of this relationship. In this paper,
the crucial role of perception on eliciting emotional reactions is highlighted, and the role
of arousal as a basic dimension of emotional experience is discussed. An interoceptive
attribution model of presence is suggested as a ﬁrst step toward an integrative framework
for emotion research inVR. Gaps in the current literature and future directions are outlined.
Keywords: virtual reality, perception, fear, anxiety, emotion, presence
INTRODUCTION
In virtual reality (VR), researchers can simulate intricate real-life
situations and contexts to investigate complex human behav-
iors in highly controlled designs in a laboratory setting. These
characteristics ofVRhave proven especially attractive for the inves-
tigation of pathological processes in mental disorders, and this
technology has steadily gained momentum since the 1990s (Roth-
baum, 2009). The main application of VR scenarios in this ﬁeld
is research into the processes underlying anxiety disorders and
their treatment. Here, VR has become established as a medium
for investigating threat perception, fear, and exposure treatment
(Mühlberger et al., 2007; Rothbaum, 2009; Opris et al., 2012;
Glotzbach-Schoon et al., 2013; Shiban et al., 2013; Diemer et al.,
2014).
For research into emotional experiences and emotional behav-
ior, such as fear, anxiety, and exposure effects, it is vital that
VR can actually induce emotional reactions. By its very nature,
VR as a medium is “unreal” and relies on perceptual stimula-
tion (including perceptual feedback of one’s own actions) – in
particular, visual cues, sounds, and sometimes touch and smell –
to trigger emotional reactions. Historically, the ﬁrst VR scenarios
applied in the ﬁeld of mental disorders used powerful visual stim-
uli to provoke emotional responses, in particular, height (Hodges
et al., 1995). Soon, more complex multimodal presentations of
visual, acoustic, and vestibular stimuli were developed, for exam-
ple, to simulate airplane travel (e.g., Mühlberger et al., 2001, 2003,
2006). Still, as it is the very nature of VR the emotional cues
relied on perceptional simulations. However, more recent studies
have highlighted the need to consider not only bottom-up pro-
cesses of perception, but also top-down effects when it comes
to understanding how VR can be emotionally engaging – e.g., a
background narrative to a VR scenario may enhance emotional
experience (Bouchard et al., 2008; Gorini et al., 2011; Mühlberger
et al., 2012; Peperkorn and Mühlberger, 2013). What is interesting
about this perspective is that VR, as a perceptual medium (e.g.,
all experiences may be interpreted as not-evidence based), enables
researchers to dissociate perceptual, i.e., bottom–up input, and
higher-level, i.e., top–down processes based on information, and
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to manipulate them independently to study their effects separately
and in combination.
Another VR phenomenon linked to emotional experience is
presence. Presence is a dimensional construct and describes the
extent to which a user feels present in a VR environment (Slater
and Wilbur, 1997; Schubert et al., 2001; Botella et al., 2009). The-
ories of presence can be divided into descriptive and structural
models. Descriptive models focus on delineating the components
of presence, like the model embedded in the Igroup Presence
Questionnaire (Schubert et al., 2001). Via factor analysis, these
authors identiﬁed three dimensions of presence: spatial presence,
involvement, and realness (Schubert et al., 2001). On the other
hand, structural models aim at an understanding of how the
experience of presence is generated in the mind. These models
focus on cognitive processes and generally suppose that direct-
ing attention to the VR environment (e.g., Witmer and Singer,
1998) and creating a mental representation of this environment
(Sheridan, 1999) are necessary processes that enable us to experi-
ence presence (Sheridan, 1999; Schuemie et al., 2001). The most
recent structuralmodel of presence, proposed by Seth et al. (2012),
goes beyond earlier theories. Their perspective is not limited to
VR, but instead, Seth et al. (2012, p. 12) point out that pres-
ence is an everyday phenomenon, “a basic property of normal
conscious experience”. Seth et al. (2012) argue that extremes of dis-
turbed presence (with regard to normal reality) can be observed,
for example, in schizophrenia and depersonalization disorder.
The basic precept of Seth et al.’s (2012) interoceptive predictive
coding model is that presence rests on continuous prediction of
emotional (interoceptive) states. For example, when expecting
the encounter with an anxiety-related stimulus, the prediction
would be fear, together with the changes the organism usually
undergoes during fear. When encountering the feared stimu-
lus, the organism compares the actual interoceptive state (fear
and its symptoms) with the predicted state. According to Seth
et al. (2012), there will practically always be a certain degree
of mismatch. Seth et al. (2012) postulate that presence is the
result of successful suppression of this mismatch between the
predicted and the actual interoceptive state – i.e., the prediction
prevails over the mismatch signals. The idea that suppression of
information that is incompatible with the VR experience is vital
for presence is not new (Schuemie et al., 2001). For example,
Sheridan (1999) posits in his estimation theory that presence is
the result of a continuously updated interiormodel of the environ-
ment, stressing the necessity for suspension of disbelief. However,
Sheridan (1999) is concerned with the prediction of environmen-
tal, i.e., external events. What is unique to Seth et al. (2012) is
their emphasis on the prediction of interoceptive states (rather
than external events), which affords a crucial role to emotional
experience.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a review
of current research into the relationship between perception and
information on emotional experience in VR environments. Since
exposure therapy has so far been the most common application
of VR technology in clinical psychology, our focus lies on VR
concerned with fear and anxiety in both healthy and clinical pop-
ulations. We present a series of our own experiments that were
designed to examine the signiﬁcance of perception vs. conceptual
information and presence for the experience of anxiety, and fear in
VR environments. Second, an integration of the literature regard-
ing immersion, presence, and emotional experience in VR is still
outstanding. Different VR systems, diverging operationalizations
of presence, and study samples ranging from healthy controls to
patients with anxiety disorders make it difﬁcult to draw ﬁrm con-
clusions. Based on a review of presence research, we suggest a new
interoceptive attribution model of presence as a step toward an
integrative framework for emotion research in VR.
EFFECTS OF PERCEPTION VS. INFORMATION ON FEAR
The most inﬂuential theoretical conceptualization of dysfunc-
tional fear to date is offered by the emotional processing theory
by Foa and Kozak (1986; McNally, 2007). According to this theory,
dysfunctional fear can be viewed as amemory network comprising
information about the feared stimulus (e.g., its characteristics), the
fear response (i.e., behavioral plans concerning escape and avoid-
ance), and propositions of meaning (e.g., association with danger
or threat; Foa and Kozak, 1986). Importantly, this fear network
can be partly or fully activated by input that matches part of the
network. Fear, according to this theory, is an index of network acti-
vation and can be measured both subjectively and physiologically
(Foa and Kozak, 1986).
Fear can be activated by at least two pathways: The percep-
tual (e.g., visual fear-related cues) and the conceptual (fear-related
information) paths. Perceptual fear-related cues are assumed
to rapidly evoke physiological and behavioral fear reactions,
whereas fear-related information is expected to produce subjec-
tive fear reactions, but only a poorer physiological activation
(Hofmann et al., 2008). Strack and Deutsch (2004) in their
reﬂective-impulsive model of social behavior propose that impul-
sive, emotional reactions are fast, and governed by the laws of
association (spreading activation), while reﬂective behavior is sub-
ject to more ﬂexible, cognitive control. However, the impulsive
and the reﬂective systems are supposed to interact, allowing con-
ceptual information (input to the reﬂective system) to activate
rapid emotional reactions (Strack and Deutsch, 2004). In practice
the separation of the two paths is difﬁcult to investigate as emo-
tionally relevant situations typically comprise input to both paths
simultaneously.
Virtual reality is a particularly suitable tool as it offers an oppor-
tunity to differentiate the two paths for eliciting emotion. In VR,
cue propositions can be activated by presenting feared objects
perceptually (e.g., visually), and, unrelated to the perceptual pre-
sentation, activating the meaning propositions by informing a
person of the existence of a feared object, or situation outside
the VR scenario they are immersed in. The laboratory setting of
VR further allows the online assessment of different fear reactions
(subjective, physiological, and behavioral) in a highly controlled
setting.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON SPECIFIC PHOBIA
In a series of studies we investigated the relative importance of per-
ceptual fear-related cues and conceptual fear-related information
on the activation of fear in different anxiety disorders.We assumed
that fear reactions in speciﬁc phobia (animal type) are primarily
caused by simple perceptual fear-related cues like a spider, whereas
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the impact of information on fear (i.e., knowing about the pres-
ence of a spider without seeing it) should be less pronounced. We
directly and separately manipulated the two paths by using VR
to present the visual cues on the one hand and the independent
information about the existence of a real fear-evoking stimulus on
the other hand.
In a ﬁrst study with patients suffering from spider phobia
(Peperkorn et al., 2014), we found that speciﬁc perceptual cues
(in this case visual simulations of a spider) and conceptual infor-
mation (verbal report that an unseen spider was present in front
of the participant) presented separately activated the fear network,
albeit via different routes. Speciﬁcally, perceptual cues vs. concep-
tual information led to different degrees of fear activation, with
the perceptual route being signiﬁcantly more fear provoking than
the informational route, as was expected for spider phobia. Fear
ratings (mean of ﬁve exposure trials) of this experiment are shown
in Figure 1.
In a second study, we addressed the question whether
these ﬁndings generalize to other types of phobias. While in
spider phobia, fear is characteristically triggered by a stereo-
typical object (the animal), in other phobias – those of the
situational subtype, e.g., claustrophobia – triggers are more
context-related, involving more complex perceptual stimuli
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Therefore, we used the
same design in a sample of patients suffering from claustro-
phobia (Shiban et al., submitted). Similar to the spider phobia
study (Peperkorn et al., 2014), we found for claustrophobia
that the perceptual condition (seeing the inside of a virtual
box with a closed door) initially activates stronger self-reported
and physiological fear responses compared to the information
condition where patients knew they sat in an actual, closed
claustrophobic box (the fear-speciﬁc information), but saw an
open door in the corresponding VR environment. It is impor-
tant to note that although both studies used mainly visual cues
as perceptual cues, in the spider phobia study the cues were
FIGURE 1 | Fear in spider phobia during exposure to spider cues in
virtual reality (cue), to a real (but unseen) spider (info), and to both.
Error bars represent SEM.
speciﬁc (a virtual spider), whereas in the claustrophobia study
they were more complex and context-related (a claustrophobic
box).
In summary, in these studies we demonstrated for the ﬁrst
time in an integrated multimodal experiment that perceptual
cues and conceptual information can provoke fear reactions
in speciﬁc phobia, with additive effects if combined. Interest-
ingly, perceptual cues alone seem to induce more self-reported
fear than information alone, regardless of the type of speciﬁc
phobia (animal vs. situational subtype). This is in line with ﬁnd-
ings that fear enhances perceptual, but not mental processing
(e.g., Borst and Kosslyn, 2010), implying that there is a closer
link between perceptual input and the experience of fear, than
between fear and the mental processing of (purely conceptual)
information.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY
As social fears are generally thought to be more cognitive in nature
than speciﬁc phobias (Clark, 2005; Schulz et al., 2008; Wieser
et al., 2010), we expected – in contrast to the results from stud-
ies on speciﬁc phobia – that anticipating a speech would be
more fear-provoking when conducted in front of an audience a
participant is informed are there (even if not seeing the audi-
ence: information condition) than in front of a virtual audience
(perceptual cues) when knowing that actually no one will listen
to the talk. Therefore, in a third study we applied a modiﬁed
version of the paradigm described above to a public speaking
challenge (Shiban et al., 2014; Diemer et al., in preparation). In
contrast to the studies of speciﬁc phobia, anticipatory anxiety was
chosen to avoid a possible confound in the physiological vari-
ables due to arousal caused by speaking (Gramann and Schandry,
2009). Also, anticipatory anxiety has been shown to share impor-
tant parts of the neural network of acute anxiety (Nitschke et al.,
2006).
We hypothesized that a real observer outside VR (informa-
tion condition) would evoke signiﬁcantly stronger subjective and
physiological fear reactions than a visual observer in VR (percep-
tual cue condition). Further, we expected that a combination of
real and VR audience (combined condition) would result in the
strongest subjective and physiological fear reactions. The experi-
mental conditions are presented in Figure 2. Finally, we expected
high socially anxious participants to show stronger fear reactions
than low socially anxious participants. We randomly allocated
48 healthy participants to either the information condition, the
cue condition, or the combined condition. (for details of physio-
logical data acquisition, see Peperkorn et al., 2014). As expected,
socially anxious participants reported signiﬁcantly higher subjec-
tive fear, but there were no differences between conditions (see
Figure 3). Physiological parameters [heart rate, skin conductance
level (SCL)] decreased signiﬁcantly over time. There was a trend
SCL to differ between groups, with the highest SCL in the visual
cue condition (p = 0.066), but there were no other effects of
social anxiety or condition. With a mean Social Phobia Inventory
(SPIN; Connor et al., 2000) score of 21.8 (median: 21, SD: 10.5),
our sample was above the mean of healthy controls (M = 12.1,
SD = 9.3), but markedly below the mean (M = 41.1, SD = 10.2)
of patients with social phobia reported by Connor et al. (2000).
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FIGURE 2 | Manipulation of fear cues and fear-relevant information in public speaking.
FIGURE 3 | Anticipatory anxiety of high and low socially anxious participants. Difference scores to baseline are given. Error bars represent SEM.
While these results are disappointing in sofar as we could not ﬁnd
the expected effect of the information condition, the paradigm
has shown promise. There was a clear effect of social anxiety,
with signiﬁcantly higher subjective fear in socially anxious par-
ticipants, and in contrast to the studies on speciﬁc phobia, no
superiority of the cue condition was found (Shiban et al., 2014;
Diemer et al., in preparation). Therefore, we believe that it would
be worthwhile to apply this paradigm in a larger sample of patients
with social anxiety disorder, and to assess acute fear during public
speaking.
SUMMARY
In summary, the VR designs reported here conﬁrmed the pos-
sibility of eliciting fear reactions via different routes (perceptual
vs. conceptual). Patients with speciﬁc phobia seem to be particu-
larly sensitive to perceptual cues. Interestingly, this ﬁnding was the
same for spider phobia (animal type) and claustrophobia (situa-
tion type). For social anxiety, nodifferences in activationof the fear
structure between the two paths were found. These observations
are in line with Foa and Kozak’s (1986) prediction about differen-
tial sensitivities of different anxiety disorders to different media of
exposure (in vivo cues vs. imagination). However, the interpreta-
tion of our results on social anxiety remains preliminary, as we did
not assess patients or acute fear as in the studies of speciﬁc pho-
bia. It seems worthwhile to continue this research with different
kinds of speciﬁc phobias and more complex anxiety disorders like
agoraphobia, panic disorder, and social anxiety disorder.
PRESENCE AND EMOTION IN VR
The association of presence and emotional experience inVR expo-
sure therapy is an issue of debate. Presence is commonly regarded
as a necessary mediator that allows real emotions to be activated by
a virtual environment (Parsons and Rizzo, 2008; Price et al., 2011).
While this conception implies a causal role for presence, research
has not yet been able to clarify the relationship between presence
and emotional experience in VR.
Presence has been conceptualized, and consequently opera-
tionalized and manipulated, in very different ways. These ranges
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from a manipulation of presence by providing more or less sophis-
ticatedVR technology to the diversemethods of assessingpresence,
either by subjective ratings taken online during the VR experi-
ence, or afterward via questionnaires. Presence questionnaires
vary greatly with regard to the constructs they measure; how-
ever, what they have in common is that they ask participants
for a subjective judgment regarding their experience of presence.
With this in mind, we will use the deﬁnition of Slater and Wilbur
(1997) and Slater (1999) and call any manipulation at the level
of technology a manipulation of immersion, rather than pres-
ence. Presence is deﬁned as a subjective phenomenon that results
from experiences induced by immersiveVR technology (Slater and
Wilbur, 1997; Slater, 1999; Schubert et al., 2001). To avoid con-
fusion with aspects of immersion (technology), for the purpose
of this paper, only subjective measures of the presence experi-
ence (ratings or questionnaires) are considered presencemeasures.
We chose not to include physiological parameters as indicators
of presence as physiology is directly linked to emotional arousal,
so considering physiological responses as operationalizations of
presence would inevitably bring a confound of presence and emo-
tion. The following section on presence and emotion considers
two approaches to presence. First, the effects of immersive VR
technology on presence and emotion are considered. Then, we
will take a closer look at correlative ﬁndings of presence and
emotion.
THE ROLE OF IMMERSION
Immersion and presence
VR simulations can be more or less graphically enhanced, multi-
modally integrated, and interactive. More sophisticated technol-
ogy is often thought to result in more presence. Already Botella
et al. (1999) reported more emotional reactions to a simple, neu-
tral VR scene when a high-quality head-mounted display (HMD)
was used, compared to a medium-quality HMD. Typically, studies
assessing different degrees of immersion ﬁnd higher presence in
more immersiveVR systems compared to less sophisticated setups.
Such effects have been reported for VR scenarios presented via a
Cave Automatic Virtual Environment (CAVE) vs. HMD (Krijn
et al., 2004; Juan and Perez, 2009), for HMD vs. computer moni-
tor (Gorini et al., 2011), video wall (a large stereoscopic projection
screen) vs. computer monitor (Baños et al., 2004), for active vs.
passive navigation in VR (Freeman et al., 2005), and for stere-
oscopy vs. monoscopy (Ijsselsteijn et al., 2001; Ling et al., 2012).
Although some researchers have failed to ﬁnd an effect of immer-
sion on presence (e.g., Baños et al., 2008, for stereoscopy), in
general, research indicates that more sophisticated simulations
(higher immersion) result in increased presence, especially in vir-
tual environments not designed to induce particular emotions
(Baños et al., 2004).
Immersion and emotion
As for possible effects of immersion on emotions, the pic-
ture becomes more complicated. While some authors report an
increase in emotional responses in more immersive compared to
less immersive VR systems (Botella et al., 1999; Juan and Perez,
2009; Visch et al., 2010), others did not ﬁnd effects of immer-
sion on emotion (Freeman et al., 2005; Ling et al., 2012). In more
detail, it seems that immersion effects on emotion might depend
on the nature of the emotions under study. Visch et al. (2010)
suggest that the effect of immersive technology is mediated by
arousal. This idea appears plausible, as especially fear and anx-
iety, both of which are strongly arousing emotions, have been
found to be stronger in more immersive VR setups (Juan and
Perez, 2009), while happiness and relaxation appear to be much
less inﬂuenced by the technology used (Freeman et al., 2005; Baños
et al., 2008). Of note, the positive emotions induced in the stud-
ies by Freeman et al. (2005) and Baños et al. (2008) were not only
of different valence than fear, but also non-arousing in nature.
In a study of spider phobia, we also found stronger subjective
and behavioral (avoidance) fear reactions in a stereoscopic vs.
monoscopic VR (Peperkorn et al., submitted). By contrast, Ling
et al. (2012) did not ﬁnd an effect of stereoscopy on emotional
reactions including fear. However, Ling et al. (2012) investi-
gated healthy participants during a speech task, so arousal levels
(mean heart rate about 75 beats per minute) appear to have been
comparatively low.
Another possibility to test the inﬂuence of immersion is the
use of different perceptual modalities or multimodal perceptual
cues. Thus, we compared tactile cues (touching a spider model)
with visual cues (visual VR spiders presented in the HMD) in
patients with spider phobia (Peperkorn and Mühlberger, 2013).
As expected, the combination of visual and tactile cues led to
the highest fear ratings. Tactile cues alone activated signiﬁcantly
stronger fear reactions than visual cues alone. Interestingly, pres-
ence was also higher in the multimodal (perceptual plus tactile
cues) than the single modus conditions, a ﬁnding that conﬁrms
the association of immersion and presence. However, the differ-
ent perceptual paths that we investigated are few out of many; for
example, acoustic stimuli can be important in speciﬁc phobia, and
can be easily implemented in VR (Taffou et al., 2012).
Taken together, there is considerable evidence that the level of
immersion a VR system provides exerts an effect on the pres-
ence experienced by the user (Ijsselsteijn et al., 2001; Freeman
et al., 2005). This effect seems to be particularly prominent in
the absence of emotional manipulations, i.e., the effect does not
seem to be mediated by emotion. The fact that immersion does
not per se increase emotional experience, but that the emotionally
enhancing effect of immersion might be limited to arousing emo-
tions (see the discussion above), supports this conclusion. For
example, Baños et al. (2004) independently manipulated immer-
sion (HMD vs. computer monitor vs. video wall) and emotional
content (sad vs. neutral) of a VR scenario. They found an inter-
action effect, with immersion affecting presence ratings in the
emotionally neutral condition, but much less so in the emotional
(sad) condition. There was also a main effect of emotion, with
higher presence in the emotional than in the neutral condition
(Baños et al., 2004). However, it is not clear from these data
why there was no immersion effect on presence in the emotional
condition; unfortunately, Baños et al. (2004) do not report the
strength of the actual emotions experienced by their participants.
As manipulations of immersion are not direct manipulations of
presence, it is impossible to determine from these ﬁndingswhether
presence is causal for emotional experience. It has been argued that
immersion causes arousal, which in turn increases presence and
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emotion ratings (Visch et al., 2010). We will come back to the issue
of arousal in the following section on correlative ﬁndings.
PRESENCE AND EMOTION
The association of presence and emotion has been mainly inves-
tigated by means of correlations between these two measures.
Correlations between presence and emotional experience in VR
have been consistently reported, especially in the literature on
VR exposure therapy (Robillard et al., 2003; Price and Anderson,
2007; Riva et al., 2007; Bouchard et al., 2008; Alsina-Jurnet et al.,
2011; Price et al., 2011), although some researchers have reported
no relation between presence and the extent of experienced fear
(Krijn et al., 2004). A common conclusion in this type of research
is that in VR exposure therapy, presence and fear appear mutually
dependent (Robillard et al., 2003; Price and Anderson, 2007). In
a recent study, we conﬁrmed the positive association, but addi-
tionally found indications that the relationship between presence
and fear might change dynamically during exposure to phobic
stimuli (Peperkorn et al., submitted). Interestingly, a general effect
of presence on treatment outcome could not be established (Krijn
et al., 2004; Price andAnderson, 2007), although Price et al. (2011)
found that scores on the presence subscale “involvement,” but not
other presence scales, predicted treatment outcome in a sample
of patients with social phobia (n = 31) undergoing VR exposure
therapy.
In the case of fear in non-patients, results are less clear. On
the one hand, there are results paralleling ﬁndings from patient
samples. For example, Alsina-Jurnet et al. (2011) exposed a large
sample (n = 210) of test-anxious students and non-anxious stu-
dents (groups assigned according to questionnaire scores) to a
VR environment that simulated a university exam, and a neutral
VR. The authors reported no correlation between fear and pres-
ence in the neutral VR, and a considerably stronger correlation
between presence and fear in the test anxious group (Alsina-
Jurnet et al., 2011). We found similar results in a sample of spider
fearful and control participants exposed to VR spiders, with sig-
niﬁcantly stronger presence in the fearful participants vs. controls,
and a signiﬁcant positive correlation between presence and fear in
the fearful participants only (Peperkorn and Mühlberger, 2013).
Whether this pattern of results is related to a ﬂoor effect and/or
reduced variability in fear ratings in the healthy samples has not
been investigated. On the other hand, research on emotions other
than fear tends to produce mixed results. In an emotion induc-
tion paradigm in VR, Baños et al. (2004, 2008, 2012) tested the
effects of different kinds of emotion on presence. They found cor-
relations between presence and emotion in healthy controls for
sadness (Baños et al., 2004), joy (Baños et al., 2008), and relax-
ation (Baños et al., 2008). Using non-immersive VR equipment,
Baños et al. (2012) could not ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations between
emotion (joy, relaxation) and presence; however, they did observe
relatively high presence ratings. By contrast, using a relaxation
paradigm presented with different levels of immersion, Freeman
et al. (2005) found only one signiﬁcant correlation between the
experience of happiness and a presence scale, which the authors
interpreted as an artifact due to item overlap.
Interestingly, some authors have also tested the effects of emo-
tions induced by information on presence. Gorini et al. (2011)
had participants search for a blood container in a VR hospi-
tal, either with the information that this was urgently needed to
save a child, or without this information. Bouchard et al. (2008)
informedpatients with snake phobia that therewere snakes in aVR
environment, while in fact, no snakes were shown. Both Bouchard
et al. (2008) and Gorini et al. (2011) reported that this emotionally
relevant background information enhanced presence, indicating
a causal inﬂuence of emotions on presence. Other possible inﬂu-
ences on presence could be personality or (spatial) intelligence
(Alsina-Jurnet and Gutierrez-Maldonado, 2010). However, little is
yet known about the inﬂuence of these, or other, traits on presence
or emotion during a VR experience.
Taken together, results show that the stronger the feelings
involved, either because of the nature of the emotion (e.g., fear
vs. joy vs. relaxation), or because of the nature of the sample
(patients with anxiety disorder vs. normal controls), the greater
the likelihood of ﬁnding a signiﬁcant correlation between pres-
ence and emotion. A possible explanation for this phenomenon
could again be arousal. Already, Freeman et al. (2005) suggested
that the correlation of presence and emotion might be limited
to arousing stimuli. They proposed an arousal theory of pres-
ence, arguing that arousal leads to alertness, which in turn leads
to higher presence ratings. According to Freeman et al. (2005,
p. 2018), alertness increases a participant’s readiness to respond
to the stimuli that compose a given VR, as arousal represents
a “call to action” – thus leading to a greater perceived physical
and mental presence in VR. So far, this arousal theory has not
been rigorously tested, although objective measures of arousal
(i.e., physiological parameters) can be easily assessed during VR
sessions (Mühlberger et al., 2007; Diemer et al., 2014). First evi-
dence for a crucial role of arousal comes from the study by Gorini
et al. (2011), who reported signiﬁcantly higher heart rate in the
group that experienced the hospital VR with a narrative that
increased the relevance of the scenario. Unfortunately, Gorini et al.
(2011) do not report correlations between heart rate and presence
ratings.
DISCUSSION
The ﬁndings reviewed here highlight important advances in the
study of fear and anxiety in VR environments. The data on
perceptual fear cues and conceptual information show that both
are viable triggers of fear reactions (Bouchard et al., 2008; Gorini
et al., 2011; Peperkorn et al., 2014; Shiban et al., in preparation).
There is evidence that patients with speciﬁc phobia react more
strongly to visual cues than to fear-speciﬁc information, a ﬁnding
that lends preliminary support to dual-process theories like the
impulsive–reﬂectivemodel of social behavior (Strack andDeutsch,
2004). The possibility of activating fear separately by perceptual
cue or information in VR opens up new research opportunities
to investigate pathological processes speciﬁc to each route. This
might be particularly relevant for cue-independent fears and anx-
iety, for example in obsessive–compulsive disorder, illness anxiety
disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.
As for presence, the literature shows the signiﬁcance of immer-
sion on presence. Speciﬁcally, greater immersion of a VR system
increases presence, particularly in emotionally neutral VR scenar-
ios, which indicates that the effect is not mediated by emotion.
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In fact, it seems that the “depth” of a VR experience in terms
of presence and emotion is more strongly inﬂuenced by factors
quite apart from the technological quality of the VR system. Cer-
tainly the effect of immersion – i.e., technological quality –
on presence exists, but interestingly, it is strongest when no
emotion is involved. As soon as a VR scenario engages emo-
tions, presence is increased. Studies that manipulate emotion
independently of the technological aspects and even the stimuli
presented via VR (e.g., Gorini et al., 2011) demonstrate this effect
quite convincingly. Further, correlations between (strong) emo-
tions and presence have been consistently reported. The effects
of immersion and emotion on presence are possibly explained
by arousal (Freeman et al., 2005; Visch et al., 2010), but theo-
ries of emotion and presence in VR (Freeman et al., 2005; Seth
et al., 2012) have so far been insufﬁciently tested. In the case of
VR exposure therapy, neither general presence nor immersion
seem to be related to treatment outcome (Mühlberger et al., 2005);
rather, a certain degree of both appears a necessary requirement
for VR exposure therapy, but increasing either does not per se
enhance therapy effects (Krijn et al., 2004; Price and Anderson,
2007).
Before the ﬁndings reported here can be integrated into one
model, more research is needed. While the data resumed so far
indicate a crucial role for arousal, the position of arousal in an
explanatory framework that comprises VR system factors, immer-
sion, aspects of stimulation (e.g., perception vs. information),
presence and emotion is not clear. First, we do not know how the
effect of perception vs. information on emotion is produced. On
the one hand, fear-related elements in VR are input cues to the
fear network – as proposed in emotional processing theory (Foa
and Kozak, 1986) – and might thus directly enhance emotional
arousal. However, this theory does not explain why, in speciﬁc
phobia, perceptual cues have a stronger effect on fear network
activation than information alone. The reﬂective–impulsivemodel
of social behavior (Strack and Deutsch, 2004) can explain differ-
ent effects of perception vs. information on fear. On the other
hand, however, emotionally relevant perceptual stimuli and infor-
mation enhance a VR environment, making it more interesting,
appealing to attention and ultimately, increasing, at least initially,
arousal – irrespective of the emotional valence of the stimuli in
question. Since arousal is a basic dimension of emotional experi-
ence, the effect of perception and information on emotion might
be mediated by arousal. The role of arousal should be tested
with emotions with different levels of arousal, using in partic-
ular physiological indicators of arousal. To broaden the range
of emotions investigated, anger would be interesting as a highly
arousing emotion other than fear that could also be activated
in VR.
Concerning presence, the preliminary conclusion we would
draw from the ﬁndings reviewed here is that the case for a crucial
involvement of arousal in the experience of presence is compelling.
However, the mechanism of this effect cannot be discerned yet.
Freeman et al. (2005) propose that arousal increases presence by
enhancing attention to a VR environment and the possibilities
of action offered by this environment. A different explanation
we suggest is an interoceptive attribution model of presence (see
Figure 4). Since presence is a subjective experience, common
FIGURE 4 | An interoceptive attribution model of presence.
measures of presence explicitly call the participants to make a
judgment of the degree of presence they feel in VR. Based on
the results reviewed in this paper, we propose that participants
make this judgment based mainly on two sources of informa-
tion: (1) immersion and (2) the degree of arousal they feel. As for
immersion, participants might base their presence judgment on
the perceptual distance they experience from the real world set-
ting, i.e., the less stimulation they receive from the real world, and
the more stimulation from the VR scenario, the higher the level of
presence they will indicate. Of course, this hypothesis needs fur-
ther empirical conﬁrmation. With regard to emotion, we believe
that participants will give higher presence ratings if they feel emo-
tionally affected. As arousal is a particularly strong indicator of
emotional involvement, arousing emotions should lead to higher
presence ratings, and correlate more closely, with presence ratings,
than calmor serene emotional states – a picture that is in fact found
in the literature. Interestingly, whether the experience of arousal
per se, or the attribution of this arousal to the VR scenario is nec-
essary for the experience of presence has not yet been investigated.
Additionally, immersion itself is likely to increase arousal (Visch
et al., 2010). In essence, the cognitive nature of presence – in that
it is a subjective judgment – forms the core of our understand-
ing of presence as it is usually conceptualized and assessed in its
relation to immersion, stimulation, and emotion in VR research.
We believe that our model is compatible with the predictive cod-
ing mechanisms put forward by Seth et al. (2012). In contrast to
Seth et al.’s (2012) conception, our model focuses on the attribu-
tion process that gives rise to cognitive presence judgments. It is
intended as a framework for research into emotional experience
and presence in VR. Future studies should therefore differentiate
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as precisely as possible between cognitive presence (presence as a
subjective judgment), emotional presence (Seth et al., 2012), and
on the other hand immersion (technological features of a given
VR system), arousal (as a dimension of emotion), speciﬁc emo-
tions (along both the arousal and the valence dimensions), and
the population under study (patients vs. fearful participants vs.
healthy controls). Further, to fully understand presence in VR and
its unique characteristics, the investigation of presence in real-
ity, e.g., during in vivo exposure as compared to VR exposure,
appears vital (Seth et al., 2012). We can reasonably assume that,
when making sense of a VR environment, people apply the same
mechanisms to it as they do to everyday reality (Seth et al., 2012).
A direct comparison of both worlds has, unfortunately, long been
neglected.
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